Abstract :
This research paper delves into the multifaceted realm of game theory in economics, exploring the profound role this mathematical framework plays in deciphering the complexities of economic decision-making. Game theory, with its foundations in strategic interaction, offers insights into the dynamics of decision-making, modeling scenarios in which rational actors navigate complex interdependencies. The exploration commences with the analysis of oligopoly and competition, where game theory unveils the intricacies of pricing and production decisions made by firms in markets characterized by a limited number of dominant competitors. The Cournot and Bertrand models serve as exemplars, guiding us through the subtleties of strategic behavior in such markets. Auctions, another pivotal arena, provide an opportunity to dissect the dynamics of strategic bidding by participants. Different auction formats, including the first-price sealed-bid, second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey), and English auctions, serve as testbeds for bidder strategies, signaling, and equilibrium outcomes. The researcher explores the intricacies of truthful bidding, revenue equivalence, and strategic behavior, offering a comprehensive perspective on the role of game theory in this domain. Nash equilibrium, a foundational concept introduced by John Nash, exposes us to the heart of rational interactions in economic scenarios. The realm of public goods and the tragedy of the commons takes us on a journey through the challenges of cooperation and resource allocation. This research paper, structured to unravel the tapestry of game theory in economics, embarks on an expedition to unveil the complexity and richness of economic decision-making, equipping us with a deeper understanding of the strategies and interactions that underpin our economic world. Through this journey, the investigation aims to present a comprehensive account of the application, implications, and relevance of game theory in the field of economics.

Keywords :
Auctions, Competition, Economics, Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium, Oligopoly, Public Goods, Resource Allocation, Strategic Interactions, Tragedy of the Commons.

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